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Abstract
The function and potential importance of statistical tests in examining and
evaluating substantive and psychological hypotheses is discussed. Psychological
hypotheses are sharply distinguished from statistical hypotheses. Decisions on statistical
hypotheses must be separated from decisions on psychological hypotheses. Some
differences between both kinds of hypotheses are addressed, and the question is attacked
whether they are complementary or not. The answer to this question is negative. The
use of the modus tollens in theory corroboration is discussed and it is argued that
evaluations of substantive hypotheses always is accompanied by some inductive aspects.
A further reason for the discontent with statistical tests is identified: Most of these tests
are rather insensitive the differential patterns of predictions and of data, whereas
differential patterns of data can be derived from nearly every psychological hypothesis
or theory. To test for these differential patterns statistical tests should be applied
thoughtfully, not routinely.
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About some misconceptions and the discontent with
statistical tests in psychology
Tests of significance according to R.A. Fisher and statistical hypotheses tests after J.
Neyman and E.S. Pearson have been under attack since the beginning of their wide-
spread implementation in psychology and other sciences (Cohen, 1994, p. 997; Pearce,
1992). This critique may be divided into two parts, one concerning the use of these tests
and the interpretation of their results by researchers and practitioners, and the other
concerning the tests themselves and their underlying rationale or logic. As a
consequence of this critique, it is recommended that statistical tests should be banned
from science, or replaced by other methods, or supplemented either by other methods or
judgment (for some critiques and recommendations in recent years see Brandstätter,
1999; Chow, 1988, 1991a, 1991b, 1996, 1998; Cohen, 1994; Cortina & Dunlap, 1997;
Folger, 1989; Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Gigerenzer, 1993; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987;
Hagen, 1997; Macdonald, 1997; Pollard, 1993; Schmidt, 1996; Sedlmeier, 1996; Serlin,
1987; Shaver, 1993; Sohn, 1993, and Wampold, Davis & Good, 1990; see also the
comprehensive treatments by Cowles, 1989, and Oakes, 1987). Banning of statistical test
has been discussed by the American Psychological Association in recent years (cf. the
special section in Psychological Science, edited by Shrout, 1997). But despite alleged
flaws or flaws detected in tests of significance and despite the serious warnings against
them, they have been used in the past, they continue to be used, and they will be used
for many years to come (for some possible reasons for this adherence see Cortina &
Dunlap, 1997; Cowles, 1989; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987; Hagen, 1997; Hager, 1992a;
Oakes, 1987, and Sedlmeier, 1996). There seems to be no reason to abandon them
because of the fact that many scientistis are unable (or unwilling) to understand their
underlying rationale properly and/or to interpret their outcome accordingly. Thus, the
present article will not begin nor end by recommending to ban these tests, on the
contrary it will try to show how statistical tests can be used in theory oriented research
despite their possible shortcomings. The opinion adhered to in this article is: Given that
these tests are continued to be used, what can be done to make better use of them? To
answer this question I firstly assume that scientists are interested in neither the
statistical tests themselves nor the hypotheses tested by them, but rather in hypotheses
of a broader scope which refer to psychological phenomena, i.e. psychological
hypotheses. The latter are quite different from those hypotheses tested by statisticalHager: Statistical Tests and Decision Rules 3
tests. I secondly assume that current practices with statistical tests can and should be
improved.
First, I shall deal with the question concerning which information scientists would
like to gain from an empirical investigation and second, I shall consider the possibilities
and limitations of the modus tollens in theory corroboration.
1. The most important question
The two statistical theories prevalent in current research are those of Fisher, and of
Neyman and Pearson. Both theories focus on testing a (statistical) null hypothesis (H0),
and thus the procedures have been called null hypothesis significance testing (NHST)
in recent discussions; I shall use this abbreviation, too, as long as it is not necessary to
distinguish between the two theories.
One severe criticism of NHST claims that it does not lead to an appropriate answer
to what we want to know, i.e. Given this data, what is the probability that H0 is
true? (Cohen, 1994, p. 997), because the primary aim of a scientific experiment is not
to precipitate decisions, but to make an appropriate adjustment in the degree to which
one ... believes the hypothesis ... being tested (Rozeboom, 1960, p. 420). Put as a
conditional probability, it is assumed to be most interesting to know !(H0|D), where !
denotes a probability and D stands for the data. But as has often been discussed (e.g.,
by Cohen, 1994; Cortina & Dunlap, 1997; Gigerenzer, 1993; Hagen, 1997; Pollard, 1993),
NHST deals solely with the probabilities !(D*|H0) and !(D*|H1), that is, with the
conditional probability of a set of possible data (D*) given the validity of the H0 being
tested or the validity of the alternative hypothesis (H1) opposed to it. Therefore, if it
were true that scientists are interested in the probability !(H0|D) they should turn to
another type of analysis which serves their need better; NHST surely does not, but
Bayesian analyses do (cf. Rouanet, Bernard, Bert, B. Lecoutre, M.-P. Lecoutre & Le
Roux, 1998). Since Bayesian analyses are not widely accepted partly because of their
alleged  subjectivity, the theory of Fisher, claimed to be an objective theory of
statistical inference independent of content (Cohen, 1990, p. 1307; see also Cowles,
1989), is often used to derive measures of evidential strength for a hypothesis (see
Mayo, 1985). Taking the empirical value of pemp = p as this measure  the distance of
the empirical and more extreme data from the H0 (Kempthorne, 1976, p. 767)  seems4 MPR-Online 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1
appropriate from the point of view of this theory which does not give another measure.
Thus, the computation of the p value is often considered the main aspect of Fishers
significance tests (Cox & Hinkley, 1974, p. 66). But this evidentialist view has been
criticized from other points of view: Since within the context of NPT [Neyman-Pearson
theory] parameter ... [values are] viewed as fixed, hypotheses about ... [them] are viewed
as either true or false. Thus it makes no sense to assign them any probabilities other
than 0 or 1 ... (Mayo, 1977, p. 304); and Kyburg (1974, p. 58) summarizes the result of
these critiques:
But although many statisticians, and essentially all psychologist .... cite significance
levels (the smaller the more proudly) ... as though they reflect a level of evidential
support applicable to the instance at hand, we know that in general this cannot be the
case.
Other scientists claim that we are not interested in whether there is a (statistical)
effect  this question can be answered by NHST  but rather in the size of this effect
(Cohen, 1990, p. 1309). But Chow (1991c, p. 1088) states that magnitude is neither
exclusive nor the ultimate concern of science. What is important is validity, namely the
question: Is theory T warranted given this set of data? Chow addresses a substantive
theory T, and this shows that there is difference between hypotheses in the realm of
statistics and hypotheses in the realms of substantive sciences such as psychology.
Statistical hypotheses are focused on by statisticians, who have no greater interest in
substantive hypotheses (indeed, they need not be interested in this kind of hypotheses
at all), but substantive hypotheses are focused on by philosophers and scientists working
in a substantive area. One of the philosophers dealing with substantive theories and
hypotheses was Popper whose methodology is sometimes addressed when discussing
NHST (e.g., Chow, 1991a, 1991b; Cohen, 1990).
According to this methodology by Popper (1984, 1992), which has been enlarged and
modified in various aspects by Lakatos (1970), scientific experiments should strive for
severe tests of substantive theories and hypotheses so that the risk of them being
falsified is maximized. The goal of investigations, then, consists of attempts to severely
scrutinize theories and hypotheses and to falsify (or to corroborate)
3 them in order
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to approach truth, which, however, can never be detected. With this methodology, the
concept of probability of an hypothesis [!(H/D)] makes no sense (Popper, 1984, p.
430-433), especially as these ! values only can refer to the statistical hypotheses actually
tested either by Bayesian analyses or by Fisher tests of significance or another statistical
method. For this reason it does not seem appropriate to assign (statistical) error
probabilities to a substantive statement, as J. Cohen (1994) did when entitling his often
cited article The earth is round (p < .05).
I shall take Poppers aims and recommendations as a starting point for my
subsequent considerations, since he can be said to have been the philosopher who most
cogently argued for the primacy of (substantive including psychological) hypotheses and
theories over the data: My point of view is ... that observation is always observation in
the light of theories; that it is only the inductivist prejudice which leads people to think
that there could be a phenomenal language, free of theories ... (Popper, 1992, p. 59,
footnote; see also Lakatos, 1970). This opinion is held by many philosophers nowadays
(cf. Boyd, Gasper & Trout, 1991), although it is not very popular in sciences like
psychology, as Gregory (1971, p. 30) stated (about thirty years later, there seems to be
no shift concerning this opinion). As Popper addresses substantive theories and
hypotheses, my primary focus is on these kinds of hypotheses which I presume are of
predominant interest to psychologists and other social scientists.
2. Substantive (psychological) and statistical hypotheses
Popper does not tell us where the hypotheses to be scrutinized come from (Popper,
1992, p. 31), but he argues strongly that they be stated before an investigation or
experiment is planned and executed (see also Hanson, 1969; Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970)
 a view held by many authors of statistics textbooks, too (e.g., Howell, 1997; Kirk,
1995; Winer, Brown & Michels, 1991). Assuming that an investigation is inspired by a
research question which is to be answered by empirical data, hypotheses can be viewed
as tentative answers to these research questions; they function as research hypotheses
(RH). They may stand alone as they often do in research practice, or they may be
derived from systems of hypotheses or theories or from previous studies (cf. Thompson,
1998).
4 Popper mainly dealt with statements which are formulated as deterministic
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universal statements referring to all members of a particular class. Statististical tests,
on the other hand, refer to probabilistic statements. Because of this, there must be a
difference between the hypotheses Popper had in mind and the hypotheses tested in
research practice.
Chow (1991c, p. 1088) writes: Consider an experimental study of the research
hypothesis that information in the short-term store is acoustic in nature. ... The
research hypothesis is given an empirical realization in the form of the experimental
hypothesis: If the research hypothesis is true, the mean of the ... [experimental] group
should be different from that of the ... [control] group. In the same vein, Howell (1997,
p. 91) states: We wanted to test the hypothesis, often called the research hypothesis,
that children under stress are more likely than normal children to exhibit behavior
problems. And he continues (p. 92): We set up the hypothesis (called null hypothesis,
H0) that the sample was in fact drawn from a population whose mean ... equals ... [a
certain value]. This is the hypothesis that stressed children do not differ from normal
children in terms of behavior problems. Chow (1991c, p. 1088) notes: A research
hypothesis and its logical complement are two mutually exhaustive and mutually
exclusive alternatives. ... The null hypothesis is chosen [as the logical complement]
because of the fact that its underlying sampling distribution is a well-defined one.
(square bracketts added)
In order to apply a statistical test one needs a sampling distribution (Bortz, 1993;
Fisher, 1966; Hays, 1988), but these distributions can only be derived with respect to
various statistical assumptions about, e.g., the population distribution or the
independence of scores, and  above all  by assuming a particular null hypothesis to
hold which usually specifies certain identities or lack of statistical association between
several variables. This null hypothesis claiming, for example, a parameter to be of a
specific values or a parameter difference to be null or zero (Rindskopf, 1998, p. 216)
then is a purely statistical one, and therefore Howells verbal description of it, referring
to psychological phenomena, is simply wrong. Basically the same holds for alternative
hypotheses (H1), which have no place or counterpart in Fishers theory. They must be
purely statistical ones, that is, they must refer to statistical concepts exclusively. This is
a necessary prerequisite to derive noncentral distributions of a test statistic which are
needed to compute the power 1 "  # of a statistical test, that is the conditional
probability of accepting the H1 on the assumption that it holds true. Any statistical test
exclusively tests statistical hypotheses. This means that Chows and Sohns research
hypothesis cannot be a statistical one.Hager: Statistical Tests and Decision Rules 7
But what is the difference between a research and a statistical hypothesis? Clark
(1963, pp. 456-457) points out: Statistical hypotheses are more restricted than are ...
[research] hypotheses just as statistical inferences are more restricted than ...
[substantive] inferences. ... Statistical hypotheses concern the behavior of observable
random variables, whereas ... [research] hypotheses treat the phenomena of nature and
man (scientific replaced by substantive once and by research twice). And Hays
(1988, p. 248) states:
A statistical hypothesis is usually a statement about one or more populations, and
specifically about one or more parameters of such population distributions. ...
Statistical hypotheses are almost never equivalent to the hypotheses of science, which
are usually statements about phenomena or their underlying bases.
Hays speaks of almost never, whereas Neyman stated that the hypotheses of science
are never identical to statistical hypotheses, since they do not mention any random
variable ... (Neyman, 1950, p. 290).
Substantive research hypotheses and statistical hypotheses both are scientific, if
they are in principle testable empirically. But since statistical hypotheses refer to
another realm of science than substantive ones do, I prefer to speak of psychological (or
substantive) and of statistical hypotheses instead of statistical vs. scientific
hypotheses. Moreover, even statistical hypotheses may function as research
hypotheses. Although I would call this type of research poor, colleagues must not
share this opinion. I am aware that there are many instances where the psychological
hypotheses are formulated about statistical constructs such as linear trends. As long
as a psychological variable plays an important role in formulating the hypothesis, it is a
psychological hypothesis. Each statistical hypothesis refers to statistical constructs
exclusively, and especially to random variables, their distributions and to some
parameters of the latter, because this is necessary to derive sampling distributions
analytically.
So, we have research hypotheses referring to some phenomena or concepts focused on
by psychologists, and we have statistical hypotheses referring to statistical concepts
such as distributions and parameters, and these two kinds of hypotheses need to be
distinguished sharply: One of the commonest confusions in thinking about statistical
significance testing lies in the conflation of substantive and statistical hypotheses
(Meehl, 1991, pp. 17-18). This conflation can possibly be traced down to Fisher, who
often failed to distinguish statistical hypotheses from simple causal [or substantive]8 MPR-Online 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1
hypotheses of wider scope, as Giere (1977, p. 27) points out (see also Bakan, 1966;
Bolles, 1962; Chow, 1991c, 1996, 1998; Kendall & Stuart, 1963, p. 161; Meehl, 1967,
1978, 1991; Neyman, 1950, p. 290; Serlin, 1987, and Wampold et al., 1990, to name but
a few authors). But the same can be said of Neyman and Pearson who also used the
term  research hypothesis, referring to substantive concepts, but considered it a
statistical alternative hypothesis (see Neyman, 1942, p. 304).
3. Complementariness
When Popper (1992) addressed substantive or psychological hypotheses he did not
consider their logical negations or complements, but demands that the predictions
agreeing with a single hypothesis must be clearly separated from those possible states in
nature which contradict the hypothesis. So, there are no opposite or complementary
(psychological) hypotheses, but two sets of possible empirical results with opposite
meaning with respect to the single psychological hypothesis:
5 One set encompasses the
prediction or predictions following from the hypothesis, the other set contains those
predictions which the hypothesis prohibits. Faced with these two sets, the researcher is
basically free to attend to the predictions prohibited or to the predictions agreeing with
the psychological hypothesis. Usually, however, the agreeing predictions are focused on
and tested.
In the same way in which all possible empirical results are divided into two sets with
opposite meaning with respect to the psychological hypothesis, statistical hypotheses
from the point of view of the Neyman-Pearson theory can be formulated to encompass
all possible (statistical) results. That is, an H1 can be formulated so that it is
complementary to an H0 and vice versa (see Bortz, 1993, p. 106-108; Hays, 1988, p.
248). A necessary prerequisite for any statistical hypothesis to function as an H0 is that
it addresses one exact value, for example, of a parameter or a difference of parameters or
the like. The H1, on the other hand, usually encompasses a set of statistical hypotheses
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deviating from the H0, although it is possible to have an exact H1, too. Thus, the pair of
statistical hypotheses tested by a Neyman-Pearson test may be !jk= !j * !k for all cells
jk, which is the standard H0 of a $2 test if applied to a fourfold table and !jk % !j * !k
for at least one cell jk is the complementary H1 ( ! denotes the theoretical
probabilities in cells jk, in rows j, and in columns k). (The preceding formulation is not
quite exact: Any NHST only tests the H0 and tests against H1 in the Neyman-Pearson
theory, since the sampling distributions always refer to an H0, irrespective of which of
the two statistical theories is applied.) The Fisher test does not consider a different H0,
but neglects of the H1.
One may state that statistical hypotheses (H0 or H1)  can serve as particular
predictions derived from a substantive hypothesis. Considering statistical hypotheses as
predictions means that they are intended to serve the function Popper (1992, p. 100)
has assigned to basic sentences, which are the basis for evaluating (psychological)
hypotheses and theories or which can be used as possible falsifiers. This interpretation
has also been chosen by Bredenkamp (1980) and by Erdfelder and Bredenkamp (1994).
I deliberately chose this interpretation of statistical hypotheses as basic sentences or
singular there-is statements (Popper, 1992, p. 102), because Popper (1992, p. 111)
explicitly states: My term basis has ironical overtones: it is a basis that is not firm
(emphasis in original)  die Basis schwankt (Popper, 1984, p. 76).
In order to serve this function, however, both kinds of statistical hypotheses must be
given equal importance, although the tests always focus on their H0. The claim of
equal importance comprises the notion that null hypotheses can be retained or accepted
which is not allowed with the Fisher theory (... the desired result is to accept or
prove the null hypothesis, which of course one cannot do, Blackwelder, 1982, p. 346),
but which seems justified within the Neyman-Pearson theory, provided some control has
been directed to the conditional probability of an error of the second kind, #. Even if
this control does not take place, in research practice null hypotheses are retained,
especially in model tests or tests of goodness of fit, be that justified or not. In cases like
these, textbook authors tend to use a pretentious language (Bortz, 1993, p. 155, speaks
of the Wunschhypothese) and to avoid the comment that the Fisherian logic of
performing NHST is, strictly speaking, not applicable. Amongst others, Bredenkamp
(1980) has given the basic arguments why null hypotheses must be acceptable from an
epistemological point of view when examining psychological hypotheses: They often
represent results that possibly lead to falsifications of a theory, and the mere
possibility of falsification is a necessary prerequiste for a theory or a psychological10 MPR-Online 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1
hypothesis to be called empirical according to Popper (1992). Cook and Campbell
(1979, p. 45) state: ... we have to make decisions and act as though the null hypothesis
were true.  But let us return to complementariness.
Although statistical hypotheses can be formulated to be complementary, there seems
to be no possibility to consider them as complementary to a particular research or
psychological hypothesis, since both kinds of hypotheses refer to quite different realms:
Claiming the short-term store to be acoustic (Chow; research hypothesis) is
complemented by the conjecture that the store is non-acoustic, leaving its nature open.
Claiming that a parameter of a specified distribution takes on a certain value (Howell;
H0) is complementary to the statistical hypothesis (H1) that its value is different from
the one addressed by the H0.
Despite this, some authors believe in this particular complementariness. Sohn (1993,
p. 1169) claims the logical complementariness of the null and the research hypotheses,
meaning that if one hypothesis is false, the other must be true. Chow (1991c, p. 1088)
is of the same opinion: A research hypothesis and its logical complement are two
mutually exhaustive and mutually exclusive alternatives. It is hence neither strange nor
backward to determine the tenability of a research hypothesis by testing its logical
complement. And Fisher (1966) considers a research hypothesis and expresses the
discrepancies from this hypothesis as a statistical null hypothesis (see the quotation
above).
But because of the lack of complementariness between the research hypothesis Chow
and Sohn are interested in and the opposite statistical null hypothesis actually tested,
the strategies they describe do not seem appropriate for evaluating the tenability of a
research hypothesis
6 (see above) by merely testing a statistical H0: The rejection of an
H0 does not imply or mean the truth or corroboration of a psychological hypothesis,
despite the fact that the strategy can be encountered in psychological research practice
quite often, based on (mostly implicitly) identifying statistical with substantive
hypotheses:
I believe that the almost universal reliance on merely refuting the null hypothesis as
the standard method for corroborating substantive theories in the soft areas is a
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terrible mistake, is basically unsound, poor scientific strategy, and one of the worst
things that ever happened in the history of psychology. (Meehl, 1978, p. 817)
As it seems to me, no further comments are necessary according the strategies
addressed by Chow and by Sohn and at least implicitly advocated by Fisher.
How can the preceding considerations be summarized? Psychological hypotheses are
examined without considering their possible complement, which, however, can be
formulated on logical grounds, but which does not refer to the same theory  scientific
theories should not be contradictory. Considering one psychological hypothesis at a
time, two sets of opposite and complementary predictions are identified and
transformed into two opposing statistical hypotheses, namely an H0 and an H1, which
similar to the two sets of predictions, cover all possible empirical results.
Let us now turn to the modus tollens and to the function of predictions in evaluating
theories.
4. The modus tollens
As is commonly acknowledged, the evaluation of hypotheses and theories is achieved
by deriving predictions from them and testing these predictions. According to Popper
and others (e.g. Erdfelder & Bredenkamp, 1994), these predictions (P) are logical
implications of the psychological or research hypothesis (PH). From this point of view it
is believed possible to evaluate the psychological hypothesis strictly logically by
applying the logical form known as modus tollens:
[(PH & P) ’ (P] & (PH.
But this presentation of the modus tollens neglects the fact that predictions cannot be
deduced from hypotheses or theories alone; in addition, auxiliary hypotheses or
statements (AH) (which Popper, 1992, p. 100, calls initial conditions) are needed,
which refer to characteristics of the planned experimental situation and to the most
important ceteris-paribus clause (( denoting logical negation, & implication, ’
conjunction, and ) disjunction):
{[(PH ’ AH) & P] ’ (P} & ((PH ’ AH) or
{[(PH ’ AH) & P] ’ (P} & ((PH ) (AH).12 MPR-Online 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1
As can be seen, when additionally considering the necessary auxiliary hypotheses the
modus tollens takes a form which makes it impossible to enforce falsification of the
theory strictly logically (for a more comprehensive account of the modus tollens see
Meehl, 1991, pp. 17-18; 1997, pp. 398-402). Popper (1992, p. 82) tries to solve this
problem by proposing a methodological rule demanding that potentially falsifying
results always be attributed to the research hypothesis instead of the auxiliary
hypotheses. This rule is problematic, and Lakatos (1970) favors the opposite strategy. It
would indeed not be very reasonable to call a research hypothesis not corroborated if
there is strong evidence that at least one important auxiliary hypothesis (such as
randomization) did not hold in the experiment. But this may not be the only difficulty
associated with the modus tollens.
Bredenkamp (1980) and Gadenne (1976) favor the modus tollens in order to make the
relationship between psychological (PH) and statistical hypotheses (SH) compatible
with Poppers methodology: If PH ’ AH, then SH or PH ’ AH & H0 or PH ’ AH
&  H1 (see also Bredenkamp, 1983; Erdfelder & Bredenkamp, 1994). Erdfelder and
Bredenkamp take the rejection of the SH as a necessary, though not sufficient condition
for falsifying the PH (Erdfelder & Bredenkamp, 1994, p. 609). Disregarding the
auxiliary hypotheses (AH), Westmeyer (1998, pp. 259-260) has shown that by applying
this kind of linkage and considering the rejection of the SH as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for falsifying the PH, logical problems result. The form If PH,
then SH is logically equivalent to If not SH, then not PH, that is, rejection of SH is
a sufficient condition for falsifying the PH. If the rejection of SH is considered a
necessary condition for this judgment, this leads to If not PH, then not SH. This is
equivalent to If SH, then PH. If combined with If PH, then SH, this leads to the
logical equivalence of PH and SH. This strictly logical argumentation then results in
consequences Bredenkamp and Erdfelder or Gadenne would not be likely to accept.
The reconstruction of the linkage between psychological and statistical hypotheses by
using the modus tollens may lead to still another problem which will shortly be
addressed.
Consider a psychological hypothesis from which the prediction of a strictly
monotonous trend for three experimental conditions is derived. Let DVk denote the
values of an observable dependent variable in condition k. Since this variable mainly
refers to psychological concepts, the resulting prediction can be called psychological
prediction (PP) which is given in an abbreviated form: DV1 < DV2 < DV3.Hager: Statistical Tests and Decision Rules 13
Using some necessary auxiliary hypotheses, this prediction logically implies (&)
the validity of several different statistical hypotheses depending on which parameter one
is interested in. Deciding on expected mean values (*) as parameters of interest one can
derive the following prediction concerning means from the psychological prediction:
(PP ’ AH) → SH: *1 < *2 < *3,
where →denotes the derivation of conforming predictions or patterns of results. 
Most researchers tend to perform an ANOVA F test thereby testing the hypothesis
H0(F):
H0 (F): *1 = *2 = *3.
Provided the test is powerful enough, the retention of this null hypothesis can be
taken as not corroborating the prediction of a strictly monotonous trend, that is, as a
basis for considering the predictions not to hold. But accepting the alternative
hypothesis of this test, namely,
H1(F): *k % *k for at least one pair k, k', with k % k',
should not be taken as agreeing with these predictions either, although it is often
done in empirical research (cf. Hager & Westermann, 1983), since this H1(F) also refers
to many data patterns contradicting the predictions and the psychological hypothesis.
One of these patterns in accordance with the H1(F), but which contradicts the
predictions above is:
M1 > M2 > M3.
Thus, if one considers the H0(F) as opposing to ones prediction and as a potentially
falsifying instance, the alternative H1(F) should completely conform to the prediction,
that is, it should encompass only patterns of results agreeing with the psychological
hypothesis and the psychological predictions. Since the opposite of the prediction [i.e.,
H0(F) in this case] does not contain every possible contradicting result, the decisions on
the predictions cannot easily be based on the result of the statistical test performed.
Two further points deserve mentioning. Firstly: Psychological hypotheses are
statements about non-observable constructs or variables. These constructs have to be
made observable by choosing proper operationalizations. In addition, an experimental
situation has to be created and an experimental design to be chosen. The prediction
refers to this particular situation, this particular design, and the particular
operationalization chosen:14 MPR-Online 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1
... a basic statement must also satisfy a material requirement  a requirement
concerning the event which, as the basic sentence tells us, is occurring at place k.
This event must be an observable event; that is to say, basic statements must be
testable, inter-subjectively, by observation (Popper, 1992, p. 102).
Substituting a non-observable construct by an operationalization and referring a
psychological hypothesis to a particular situation always leads to a loss of content or
meaning, that is of the Aussagegehalt, as Westmeyer (1998, p. 259) calls it. The
examinations therefore are necessarily weak with respect to these reductions. If, as is
usually the case, the evaluation of the psychological hypothesis is based on evaluations
of predictions with (necessarily) less content or meaning, this evaluation inevitably
comprises an (inductive) enhancement of the content relative to the statements actually
put to test. This inductive component when evaluating psychological hypotheses does
not seem to have been taken into account by Popper nor by many scientists referring to
him, and focusing on the (deductive) modus tollens seems an elegant way to loose sight
of this aspect (see Westermann & Gerjets, 1994, pp. 441-443, for some further important
inductive elements even in Poppers allegedly strict deductive methodology).
Secondly: When testing psychological hypotheses by means of statistical ones, a
further reduction of its meaning or content results. This further reduction is a
consequence of replacing the individual values for these operationalizations by a testable
statistical hypothesis usually referring to aggregated data. The examinations therefore
are necessarily weak with respect to this reduction.
So there seem to be some good reasons not to rely on the modus tollens too heavily,
and my main reservation against its application when evaluating psychological
statements lies in the fact that it serves to conceal that hypothesis or theory evaluation
always encompasses some inductive aspects. Some methodologists are eager to avoid this
legacy of logical positivism (Achenstein & Barker, 1969) and they feel attracted by
the alleged strict deductive and logical structure of Poppers methodology. Moreover,
deductive arguments are deemed more scientific than inductive ones. But logic is not
everything, as Chow (1991b, p. 391) states, and science has done well using
arguments that are not logically valid. In the absence of an alternative, it will have to
continue to do so, as Hagen (1997, p. 22) points out.
But if a logical link cannot reasonably be constructed between psychological and
statistical hypotheses, what different possibilities remain?Hager: Statistical Tests and Decision Rules 15
Meehl (1967) seems to be one of the first authors who argued for linking
psychological and statistical hypotheses by means of derivation, even in a rather
loose sense of derive (Meehl, 1967, p. 104): On the basis of a substantive psychological
theory ... in which he is interested a psychologist derives ... the consequence that an
observable random variable X will differ between two groups of subjects. If one
enhances this derivation by certain criteria chosen to clearly identify the conforming and
the disagreeing results, i.e. adeqacy and exhaustiveness of derivation (cf. Hager, 1987),
which cannot be discussed here, unequivocal derivations become possible, which can
serve as a basis for evaluating the psychological hypothesis based on the results of
statistical tests.
Let us consider a further possible reason for the discontent with NHST, usually not
addressed when criticizing statistical tests.
5. A further possible reason for the discontent with NHST
Our psychological hypotheses, although they are mostly qualitative in nature, become
the more complex the more we know about psychological phenomena, and the more
complex a psychological hypothesis is, the more complex is the predicted pattern of
results. But nevertheless it is customary to analyze the data by routine and global
statistical methods such as analyses of variance, of covariance, or of regression. This
means that avalaible computer programs determine which statistical hypotheses must be
of interest whereas this should be determined by the psychological hypothesis to be
examined. The results of these methods are unspecific with respect to the complex
psychological hypotheses and leave much to the researcher. For: The most important
limitation of the omnibus F-test is that it is so general that it typically does not address
an interesting substantive question (Olejnik & Huberty, 1993, p. 6; cited after
Keselman et al., 1998, p. 359; emphasis added; see also Olejnik & Hess, 1997)  a
statement which is shared by many authors of textbooks. What does it mean?
F tests and other test statistics based on squared statistics such as all multivariate
criteria test statistical hypotheses which are bidirectional with respect to expected
means or unsquared correlations, but directional with respect to the statistics variance
and squared correlations. On the other hand, usually psychological hypotheses claim
that some unidirectional relationship holds between the independent or predictor and
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change which encompasses changes in either direction. Thus, F and similar tests do not
give an information about the direction of change.
As far as most of our psychological hypotheses consist of statements about a direction
of change, the psychological predictions and especially the statistical hypotheses which
are formulated to test psychological hypotheses should be directional with respect to
unsquared test statistics (Hays, 1988, p. 255). Directional statistical hypotheses can be
best tested by means of the method of planned or a priori contrasts which can also be
applied in the rather rare cases where the psychological hypothesis and the predictions
are bidirectional (cf. e.g., Hager, 1987, 1992a; Hager & Westermann, 1983; Hays, 1981,
S. 431-432; Howell, 1997, S. 350-351; Keppel, 1991; Kirk, 1995; Marascuilo & Levin,
1983, S. 337-338; Maxwell & Delaney, 1990; Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1985; Tabachnik &
Fidell, 1989, S. 49-50; Thompson, 1994). For this method, several advantages over the
more unspecific statistical analyses can be identified: 1) Focused test via contrasts are
easy to compute and understand; 2) focused tests are very flexible; 3) a more
interpretable measure of effect size is available; 4) accurate determination of sample
size is possible; 5) planned tests provide more powerful tests than unplanned or post
hoc analyses (Cohen, 1988); 6) focused tests answer the researchers question (Olejnik
& Hess, 1997, p. 222-229) and 7) if connected with the appropriate planning, planned
tests allow for controlling the cumulation of statistical error probabilities.
Planned contrasts, moreover, need not be orthogonal (cf., e.g., Winer, 1971, S. 175),
which most often is the predominant criterion when constructing contrasts. And
planned contrasts may well be based on test variances computed by traditional methods
of analysis of variance or covariance (Kirk, 1995). Although it is possible to add post
hoc tests to global procedures, one must take account of the fact that these tests refer to
statistical hypotheses which are bidirectional with respect to unsquared parameter
values such as means, and they are less powerful than planned contrasts (see also Kirk,
1995; Thompson, 1994). The less powerful a statistical test, the lower ceteris paribus the
statistical validity of the study. This fact is well-known, but considered only rarely.
Moreover, the application of overall analyses, usually followed by more detailed
analyses, is often justified with the argument that the overall tests control for
cumulating +t values, but they dont, as has been shown, amongst others, by Harris
(1985, pp.170-177), Ramsey (1980, pp. 319-320), and Share (1984, p. 351); see for a
more comprehensive discussion Hager (1992a, pp. 374-381). As # can cumulate moreHager: Statistical Tests and Decision Rules 17
often than + does (Westermann & Hager, 1986), this procedure is defective for still
another reason.
The interpretation of data most often seems to rest on the results of analyses which
are performed after the global tests, be these multi- or univariate, as Keselman et al.
(1998) have shown (see also Olejnik & Hess, 1997). This shows that researcher most
often are interested in the results of more detailed analyses, and is some way from
understandable, why statistical analyses are not planned accordingly from the very
beginning.
Differentiated questions and complex psychological hypotheses which can be
formulated in (nearly?) each area of psychology in view of the accumulated knowledge
should always be accompanied by differentiated statistical procedures, which does not
mean complex tests, but simple tests adjusted to complex questions and hypotheses,
since: Dont expect one size to fit all, as Keselman et al. (1998; p. 378) correctly point
out. In order to get the generally important information concerning the direction of a
change one-sided t and z tests should be preferred to more complex, but unsuited global
tests.
The fact of the wide-spread application of global tests in my opinion shows that only
few researchers spend cognitive energy on deliberating before the study what they want
to know after the study. I dont think it helpful to refrain from considerations
concerning the very psychological hypothesis one wants to examine, but to apply
routine statistical global analyses instead and then to complain that the results of these
analysis are so unspecific, which  of course  must be due to the flaws asscociated with
NHST. Many of the flaws alleged to NHST seem to stem from the fact that the
potential and flexibility of null hypotheses significance tests are not used in research
practice. So, one way to overcome some of the flaws alleged to NHST is to carefully
derive predictions which can be tested by means of statistical tests. Another way
consists lowering the factual importance of statistical tests by interpreting them as
devices of decision.
6. Interpreting statistical tests
Any investigation refers to a single experimental situation, and its outcome can be
formulated as a basic statement according to Popper. If one considers statistical
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situation. On the other hand, statistical hypotheses are usually said to refer to
populations (e.g., Hays, 1988) to which scientists are said to seek to generalize or to
make inferences about. If one uses statistical tests this way, that is, if one interprets the
individuals examined in the sample as a random sample from a population and if one
assumes to apply a theory to a population of individuals, the statistical test constitutes
an  auxiliary theory with empirical content (empirical content in the sense used by
Popper, 1992), insofar as the well-known parametric assumptions of the respective tests
are basically considered testable assumptions concerning the specified variables in a
specified population (see Westermann, 1987, pp. 122-123, for the details). Additionally,
if one seeks to generalize to some population, it is necessary to examine samples which
constitute a random sample from the populations of interest. But random samples are
only very rarely drawn in psychological research  if ever. Instead, individuals are
examined who are willing to participate in the investigation and who are mostly
randomly distributed to the levels of the independent variables (randomization). Given
the practice mentioned, one way to approach the problem is to consider the numerical
values of the investigation (not necessarily the individuals!) as a random sample from
hypothetical populations (Westermann, 1987).
But statistical tests can also be applied without assumptions concerning populations,
as the various rank tests show. These tests are based on the principle of randomization
introduced by Fisher (1956). This principle enables generation of the necessary sampling
distributions without referring to populations. It can be applied to parametric tests such
as the t or many F tests in analysis of variance as well (Edgington, 1980; Marascuilo &
McSweeney, 1977, pp. 264-267). The (central) sampling distributions of these
randomization tests can be approximated by the sampling distributions derived for
particular population distributions (Bredenkamp, 1980, pp. 20-22).
Based on this device, the statistical test, then, is no longer a means to test
hypotheses about populations nor is the question concerning the assumptions associated
with parametric tests in principle empirically decidable. Instead, the test serves as an
auxiliary theory without empirical content, and the hypothetical populations can be
described by characteristics convenient for the test to be administered or by
characteristics usually and conventionally assumed when dealing with a particular
theory or kind of empirical situation or system (Westermann, 1987, pp. 120-124). It is
also possible not to consider any populations at all, but referring the statistical
hypotheses to the sample at hand (cf. Vokey, 1998, p. 225) as is the case with rank
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relative to some criteria which always have to be fixed (in advance) when dealing with
non-deterministic hypotheses (Lakatos, 1970; Popper, 1992, pp. 190-191): Every test of
a theory, whether resulting in its corroboration or falsification, must stop at some basic
statement or other which we decide to accept (Popper, 1992, p. 104; emphasis in
original). In empirical research practice statistical hypotheses are chosen as the point of
stopping. Therefore, it is necessary to give a decision rule for accepting or rejecting basic
statements. What can NHST offer us?
Usually a significant value of a test statistic is taken as a basis for inferences
concerning certain populations  or textbooks (e.g., Bortz, 1993) advise us to act in this
way. The theory by Fisher is appropriate for these inferences, although it only allows
the rejection of an H0 what Cohen (1990, p. 1308) claims to be tantamount to you
could hardly conclude anything. The theory of Neyman and Pearson (NPT) can be
applied with the same aim, but it is also possible to interpret this theory as one of
decision between two opposite statistical hypotheses (e.g., Birnbaum, 1977; Cook &
Campbell, 1979; Giere, 1972, 1977; Mayo, 1985; Walster & Cleary, 1970; Winer, 1971, p.
10). If one accepts the idea of two sets of predictions, one agreeing and one disagreeing
with the psychological hypothesis (see above), it is advantageous to associate them with
opposite statistical hypotheses and to be able to control the probabilities of erroneous
statements about these predictions  every decision theory tries to minimize decision
errors or the probabilities of them. Interpreted as a decision rule, the decision criteria for
the Neyman-Pearson version of NHST must be fixed prior to experimentation. This is
not as easily possible with the Fisher theory which does not enable the control of # nor
is it necessary with this theory to fix + in advance (Cox & Hinkley, 1976, p. 67). One
advantage of the NPT over the Fisher theory is the possibility of controlling and
keeping low the values of both conditional error probabilities, + and #, prior to
experimentation (see also Cook & Campbell, 1979, pp. 39-40; but see, e.g., Macdonald,
1997, for reasons as to why the the Fisherian approach is preferable). This, however,
makes it necessary to assume that noncentral sampling distributions derived by the
principle of randomization can be approximated by analytically derived noncentral
distributions based on the usual parametric assumptions as those used by Cohen (1988).
As the error probabilities are given a frequentist interpretation (in the long run) and
the statistical hypotheses of NPT are referred to a particular empirical situation (or
system), a given experiment should be viewed as one realization out of a large number
of repetitions of this investigation under the same or at least very similar side
conditions. In addition,20 MPR-Online 2000, Vol. 5, No. 1
Error probabilities are deemed objective in that they refer, not to subjective degrees
of belief, but to frequencies of experimental outcomes in sequences of (similar or very
different) applications of a given experimental test. Since within the context of NPT
[Neyman-Pearson theory] parameter ... [values are] viewed as fixed, hypotheses about
... [them] are viewed as either true or false. Thus it makes no sense to assign them
any probabilities other than 0 or 1, ... . But the task of statistical tests arises in
precisely those cases where the truth or falsity of a hypothesis is unknown. The sense
in which NPT nevertheless accomplishes this task objectively is that it controls the
error probabilities of tests regardless of what the true, but unknown value of ... [the
parameter] is. (Mayo, 1985, pp. 304-305)
Supplementing these basic prespecifications, a rule of deciding is defined: Accept H0,
if the empirical value of the test statistic chosen falls into a predefined region of
acceptance, and accept H1 in all other cases. This well-known and simple binary rule of
accept/reject, seems sufficient if one uses NPT to decide on or to evaluate
psychological hypotheses, since ... there is no conflict between the dichotomous nature
of significance tests and the evolution of scientific knowledge, as Chow (1991a, p. 351)
points out. In addition: A [statistical] hypothesis ... is accepted because it has passed
an appropriate test ..., as Giere (1977, p. 21; one word added) states, and the theory
of Neyman and Pearson can be used to interpret appropriate test, although this may
be difficult in case of multivariate analyses (Olson, 1976). The rule includes accepting or
retaining null hypotheses (see above).  Moreover, another rule commonly applied and
possible with the Neyman-Pearson theory says that rejection of one of the
complementary hypotheses is tantamount to accepting the other one (Neyman, 1942, p.
303; cf. Hays, 1988, p. 248; Sedlmeier, 1996, p. 47). This rule is used here although it is
known that with usual NHST there is a bias in favor of the H1 if + % #, as is usually the
case in empirical research.
The decision  a notion Fisher always rejected  can then be taken as a basis to
behave as if the hypothesis accepted were true (what Sedlmeier, 1996, p. 48, calls
Handlungsentscheidung)  until different empirical results occur (Cook & Campbell,
1979, p. 45; Neyman, 1957; Neyman & Pearson, 1933, p. 291), that is, one acts as if the
(statistical) hypothesis which is accepted in the light of the experimental data holds
true, and any statement concerning its real status or its actual truth is avoided
(behavioristic model of testing as opposed to the evidentialist model associated with
the Fisher theory; see Giere, 1977; Mayo, 1985). Nor are statistical hypotheses ever
proved  hypotheses of any kind can never be proved in the sense of establishedHager: Statistical Tests and Decision Rules 21
firmly, unambiguously, definitely, and beyond all reasonable doubt (Popper, 1981, p.
103), since the data concerning them is always fallible and always not firm, as Popper
(1992) states (see above). In addition, within the framework used here, it is
inappropriate to speak of falsifying or corroborating a statistical hypothesis  these
terms should be used only with psychological hypotheses.
Overall, statistical tests here are interpreted as conventionalistic decision rules which
allow control for the probabilities of wrong statements concerning statistical hypotheses
serving as basic statements, that is they refer to samples or a single empirical system.
They are widely accepted and performed in empirical scientific research, although not as
widely understood, and even the criteria necessary for applying these decision rules,
such as certain numerical values for the level of significance, are agreed upon by most
scientists. This does not mean that these tests are indispensable with (many scientists
did well before the probabilistic revolution, which occurred in Germany in the early
sixties), as they have some shortcomings, but most of these arise when one tries to get
information from NHST which it is not designed to give (Cowles, 1989; Giere, 1977;
Mayo, 1983, 1985; Oakes, 1989). Nor are they without alternatives. These alternatives,
however, are either not well suited for examining given psychological hypotheses (as is
the case with Bayesian analyses), or not widely accepted (see for this criterion
Westermann, 1987, p. 124), or not generally applicable in practice (as is with sequential
tests: consider a therapy evaluation with various catamnestic investigations, the analysis
of which is based on sequential tests; and with likelihood tests which only consider one
exact parameter value of a distribution whose form is known), or they convey basically
the same information as statistical tests (as is the case with confidence intervals which
can be used to supplement NHST, but not to replace it; Cortina & Dunlap, 1997, pp.
169-170; but see Brandstätter, 1999, who argues for confidence intervals replacing
statistical tests)
7.  The advantages of NHST over its banishing from research have been
considered by Westermann (1987, pp. 119-124; see also above) in some detail.
Since Fishers theory only allows the rejection of an H0 and since Fisher explicitly
refuted dealing with a (statistical) H1 it seems more appropriate to turn to the Neyman-
Pearson theory of testing statistical hypotheses (NPT). This theory can be interpreted
as a theory of decision between opposite statistical hypotheses, that is, it can be used as
                                     
7 Brandstätter (1999) states that confidence intervals can be applied without a priori hypotheses, which is
an advantage. In my eyes this is a disadvantage, because without a priori hypotheses no experiment can
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a tool for making decisions on basic statements  these statements must always be
decided upon (Popper, 1992). Although NPT does not necessarily constitute an optimal
decision strategy, it is satisficing according to Giere (1977, p. 54), as it enables the
researcher to consider both statistical hypotheses and the conditional error probabilities
(+ and #) associated with them. As a decision theory the NPT is still rough and
leaves many decisions to the researcher. But this is an advantage rather than a
disadvantage, since decisions are conscious ... [and] voluntary (Yates, 1990, p. 3). As
current practice can be characterized by a hybrid mixture of both theories (Gigerenzer,
1993; Gigerenzer & Murray, 1987) with Fisherian ideas dominating (but see Sedlmeier,
1996, p. 48), I argue for predominant use of pure NPT, even if  interpreted as a
decision rule  one must assume that the (parametric) noncentral sampling distributions
can be approached by randomized noncentral sampling distributions.  On the other
hand, there seems to be no good reason for arguing against using graphical or other
methods deemed appropriate in addition (see, e.g., Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Sedlmeier,
1996).
7. Summary
This article deals with some questions concerning statistical tests. Some common
misconceptions are addressed, especally the question whether statistical hypotheses can
be complementary to psychological ones. The answer to this question is negative, and it
is most important to separate statistical from psychological hypotheses sharply. The use
of the modus tollens in connection with statistiscal hypotheses is discussed with the
result that its use in hypothesis or theory corrobration is problematic. Some further
reasons concerning the discontent with statistical tests are identified, claiming that most
global analyses do not address questions of interest to the researcher. It is argued for the
use of differential analyses of predicted patterns by menas of planned contrasts. In the
last part different interpretations of statistical tests are discussed, and it is proposed to
interpret these tests as decison rules  a proposal, which is not new, but can be traced
back to some of the work of Neyman and Pearson.
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